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THE NAVAL BATTLE OF PARIS
Jerry W. Jones
It involved no fleet action, and only verbal salvos were exchanged, but the “navalbattle of Paris” was a high-stakes diplomatic contest that threatened to poison
the good relations between erstwhile allies Britain and the United States and that
at one point disrupted the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The common goal of
defeating imperial Germany ensured Anglo-American cooperation while the
war lasted, but as soon as an armistice appeared imminent, both powers began
to maneuver to secure their postwar interests. Previously obscured by the com-
mon crusade against a common foe, the reality of conflicting war aims and inter-
ests now threatened the peace.
By 1918 President Woodrow Wilson had emerged as the most articulate pro-
ponent of a new era of international relations based upon law and international
cooperation. Enshrined as it would be in the “Fourteen Points,” a Wilsonian
peace promised to end the kind of great-power rivalry that had led to the Great
War. The most revolutionary part of Wilson’s program was the establishment of
a League of Nations—not only a forum for arbitration but a vehicle for collective
security.
Despite Wilson’s liberal internationalism and support for disarmament,
however, during the conference he threatened a naval arms race with Great Brit-
ain. The challenge to British naval supremacy alarmed
the British and nearly alienated the European partner
most sympathetic to Wilson’s vision of the peace. The
United States and Britain, both great trading powers,
had much to gain from cooperation and much to lose
if attempts at collective security failed to halt a slide
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into renewed great-power rivalry. The failure to set aside their naval and com-
mercial competition at Paris ultimately helped undermine Anglo-American
hopes that together the two nations could forge a system of international coop-
eration to keep the peace and promote global trade. Wilson’s conduct of the ne-
gotiations was most unwise. While the threat of a naval race gave Wilson
leverage at the conference, coercion came at the cost of damaged relations with a
vital ally.
Originally, as the Great War raged in Europe, Wilson had been determined to
keep America out of the war while protecting its trading rights as a neutral
power. In a situation not very different from the Napoleonic Wars, both Britain
and Germany were violating the American notion of neutral rights in their at-
tempts to deny U.S. trade to the other.1 Germany’s U-boat campaign was more
brutal than Britain’s blockade, and unrestricted submarine warfare was widely
viewed as an atrocity against noncombatants and contrary to international law.
Ultimately, of course, unrestricted submarine warfare would force Wilson to de-
clare war on Germany and join the Entente powers. Nevertheless, Wilson fumed
that the United States could not resist British restrictions on U.S. trade because
of the supremacy of the Royal Navy. In September 1916 Wilson remarked to his
closest adviser, Colonel Edward House, “Let us build a bigger navy than hers and
do what we please!”2 Wilson was beginning to see the U.S. Navy not only in its
traditional role of providing security but as an instrument of diplomacy.3 The
result of Wilson’s new appreciation of naval power and public enthusiasm for it
was the unprecedented three-year naval building program of 1916.
The bill called for $300 million in appropriations—more than double those
for the preceding year and six times the naval funding for the Spanish-American
War.4 Had American entry into the First World War not intervened, the program
would have given the United States twenty-seven battleships, six battle cruisers,
and over 350 smaller warships—approaching parity with the Royal Navy by
1921. In terms of modern capital ships, the U.S. Navy would have been superior.
In the event, the danger that U-boat depredations might defeat Britain in the
spring and summer of 1917 forced the reluctant Wilson administration to post-
pone dreadnought construction and concentrate on escort craft to defeat the
U-boats. Wilson remained committed, however, to continuing the dreadnought
program as soon as conditions permitted.5
If the United States was concerned in 1918 with neutral rights and the
strength of the fleet, the British were worried that the end of the war might see
naval and mercantile supremacy pass to the Americans. As vexing as the 1916
building program had been to the British, the dramatic growth of the U.S. mer-
chant marine during the war was equally troubling. Would the United States
capture markets Britain had formerly held? On 2 August 1918, as Allied armies
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were beginning the series of offensives on the western front that would lead to
the end of the war, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Eric Geddes, presented a
memorandum to the War Cabinet. He complained that while Britain had been
maintaining a huge war fleet, the United States had produced very few warships
for convoy escort duties, eleven a month, while building great numbers of mer-
chantmen. He warned that Britain’s position as the world’s shipper and premier
shipbuilding country was imperiled: “Are we to go on losing ships in our Allies’
interest, and repairing ships for them while they overtake us in their Mercantile
Marine?” The building of U.S. battleships was also resuming. Geddes insisted
that the United States be induced to shift its priorities to destroyers so British
yards could focus on merchantmen, to make up for Britain’s great shipping
losses during the war.6 It soon became clear to the Admiralty, however, that it
could not count on the use of any U.S. destroyers until 1919; Geddes now re-
ferred to the United States as “a naval liability” and a “tax on the alliance.”7
During mid-October 1918, as Germany sought an armistice based on Wil-
son’s Fourteen Points, the Navy Department and Admiralty were already con-
templating how the naval section of the armistice terms might affect their
relative positions.8 The British pressed for harsh naval terms, including the sur-
render and destruction of the German surface fleet, leaving Germany with only a
coastal defense force. Wilson and the Navy Department, in contrast, wanted le-
nient naval terms, because the destruction of the German fleet would leave Brit-
ain without a significant European rival, in which case the Royal Navy could “do
with our new merchant marine as she saw fit.”9 The Admiralty, for its part, now
began considering the implications of the second of Wilson’s Fourteen Points:
“freedom of the seas.” That aspiration enshrined the traditional U.S. position on
neutral rights in wartime—the very issue that had provoked American entry
into the war. The Admiralty took alarm at the thought of placing restrictions on
Britain’s ability to conduct effective blockades. Was not the purpose of sea power
to deny overseas communication to an enemy? The blockade was clearly an im-
portant factor in the approaching German defeat. The British Empire could not
in future wars afford to trust its security to an untested international organiza-
tion (Wilson’s League) or surrender the bulwark of sea supremacy, which had
never failed it.10
In its battle against freedom of the seas, the Admiralty had the unshakable
support of Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Lloyd George insisted that Brit-
ain could not abandon its principal strategic weapon. In response, Wilson, re-
sorting to “brinkmanship,” instructed House to tell the Allies that they could
either accept freedom of the seas or the United States would build “the strongest
navy that our resources permit and as our people have so long desired.” House
amplified the president’s message by pointing out the United States had more
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resources and money than they—that if it came to a contest, Britain would lose.
Lloyd George held his ground, retorting that Great Britain would “spend her last
guinea to keep a navy superior to that of the United States or any other power.”11
However, anxious to avoid an open break over freedom of the seas yet deter-
mined not to surrender on the issue, Lloyd George offered to defer the matter to
the peace conference; Wilson accepted that olive branch.
In any case, as would become clear, Wilson’s broadening concept of the
League of Nations made freedom of the seas moot—in a world without neutrals
there would be no wars except between the League and outlaw states. Wilson ul-
timately abandoned his support for freedom of the seas, later explaining that it
had been a “practical joke” on himself, since Point Fourteen (“a general associa-
tion of nations”) eliminated the need for Point Two.12
There remained the issue of the U.S. naval building program, which assumed
even larger dimensions. In late October 1918 the Wilson administration raised
the ante and asked Congress for a second three-year naval building program, a
repeat of the 1916 program plus ten additional battleships and six battle cruis-
ers. Wilson now had a bigger club, or bargaining chip, to use at the peace confer-
ence, as well as clear evidence for the American people that failure to endorse the
League would mean expensive defense policies.13 In his annual message to Con-
gress on 2 December 1918, Wilson declared that he took it for granted Congress
would continue the naval building program begun in 1916. He implied that the
new program was simply a continuation of the long-term development of the
Navy and insisted that the building program should continue: “It would clearly
be unwise for us to attempt to adjust our programs to a future world policy as yet
undetermined.”14
Two days later Wilson boarded the transport ship George Washington, es-
corted by the battleship Pennsylvania, for Brest, in France, and the peace confer-
ence. Once in France Wilson became increasingly bitter about the motives of the
Allied statesmen. At a dinner with a few Americans on 10 January, he opened his
mind. He seethed with indignation that the French wanted rent for the use of
their trenches and that the British were demanding payment for each American
soldier transported in British ships to fight in their cause. He made a distinction
between the people of Europe, who wanted a just peace, and the ruling classes,
who cared only for their national rivalries.15
While the president was in France, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels
was energetically promoting the naval building program to the American pub-
lic. In a lengthy press release Daniels explained the administration’s motives and
why it was imperative to support the program. Arguing in moralistic terms,
Daniels said the country had no designs on the territory or trade of other na-
tions but was “pledged to the protection of the weak wherever they may suffer
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threats.” The nation would have to be “strong in defense against aggressors and
in offense against evil doers.” Should the peace conference fail to create a “world
police force” to keep peace in the new order, the United States would have to cre-
ate “incomparably the greatest Navy in the world.” Here indeed was not just jus-
tification for naval expansion but an expansive vision of the Wilson
administration’s internationalist agenda.16 Clearly thinking of his negotiating
position in the peace conference, Wilson sent a message to Secretary Daniels en-
couraging him to continue pushing for the new building program, which was
“essential to our purpose here.” He revealed that he was willing to accept a pro-
viso in the pending naval legislation that if the peace conference adopted some
agreement to reduce armaments (the fourth of the Fourteen Points, “national
armaments would be reduced”), he could postpone building contracts pending
consultation with Congress.17
In late January the American, British, and French naval leaders established a
committee in Paris to consider the naval terms of the treaty. The American rep-
resentative, Admiral William Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations and Wil-
son’s technical adviser on naval affairs during the conference, soon clashed with
the British First Sea Lord, Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, and the French Chief of Naval
Staff, Ferdinand de Bon. The thorniest issue was the final disposition of the in-
terned German fleet. Benson favored sinking the German ships, so they would
not affect the postwar balance of naval power. Admiral de Bon wanted them dis-
tributed, so France could have compensation for its lack of naval construction
during the war. Wemyss entertained destruction of the German ships, but only
as part of an Anglo-American agreement on new naval construction. Benson’s
position found support in a lengthy memorandum by the U.S. Naval Advisory
Staff in Paris.18 Ignoring the inconsistency of calling for reduction of armaments
while embarking on a major building program, the Advisory Staff argued that
destruction of the German ships would “be a practical demonstration of the sin-
cerity of the High Contracting Parties of the determination to reduce arma-
ments.” If distribution happened, the United States should abstain: “America is
proud to claim that she came into this war with clean hands and will come out
with empty hands.” After evoking the specter of an Anglo-Japanese combination
aimed at the United States, the document called for naval parity with Britain,
concluding, “World interests demand that no single power may rule the sea
against all comers.”19
By early March the committee of naval leaders was deadlocked. Moreover,
Admiral Benson’s insistence on naval parity with Britain was increasingly at
odds with the administration’s diplomacy. Benson’s biographer Mary Klachko
writes, “House shared the president’s conception of the building program as pri-
marily a diplomatic bargaining chip, whereas Benson wanted to construct the
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ships.”20 Meanwhile, the Admiralty was considering how best to respond to the
American naval challenge. In a shrewd and insightful memorandum to the War
Cabinet the Admiralty advised tact, caution, and restraint. The Admiralty noted
the deep political divisions already apparent in the United States, where the Re-
publican Party, hostile to the building program, controlled Congress. The Admi-
ralty recognized that many in the United States would support equality with
Britain but argued that any program to gain supremacy was certainly a bluff;
most Americans, it believed, were not anti-British but jealous of American dom-
inance in the Western Hemisphere. The paper warned that “any ill-judged ac-
tion on our part might be fanned to produce among them such a wave of
spread-eagleism as to force the government to carry through the biggest naval
programme, even if the President does not really mean or wish to do so.” Finally,
the memorandum recognized the deep distrust between the two countries but
dismissed the threat of war as “unthinkable.”21
In late March Wilson returned to Paris after a month in the United States.
Daniels too arrived in Paris, and it was shortly after Daniels’s arrival that the
most heated confrontation of the “naval battle of Paris” took place. The First Sea
Lord, Wemyss, called on Daniels at his hotel, and the secretary sent word to
Benson to join the discussions. Benson, when he arrived, was shocked to find his
British counterpart pressing Daniels about the U.S. naval building program.
Benson later reported that Wemyss demanded to know why the Wilson adminis-
tration had undertaken its naval increase and to what extent the administration
planned to carry it out. Indignant, Benson shook his finger at Wemyss, retorting,
“By what authority do you presume to come over here and ask such a question
from our Secretary?”22 There is no complete account of what followed, but
Daniels wrote in his memoirs that while the two admirals did not descend to
cursing one another, they came close, and he had to intervene between them.23
The next day, 27 March, Daniels and Benson met with the First Lord of the
Admiralty (the First Sea Lord’s civilian senior), Walter Long. Wemyss was not at
the meeting, presumably to avoid an altercation with Benson. Long told the
Americans that Great Britain simply could not abide coming out of the war a
second-rate naval and commercial power. After Long’s explanation of Britain’s
need to maintain sea supremacy, Benson demanded to know whether Britain,
simply because it had always been supreme, would try to remain supreme at all
hazards. After reflection, Long replied, “Well, Admiral, that is about the size of
it.” Benson responded that if the British government continued policy along
those lines it would mean “war between Great Britain and the United States.”
Daniels affirmed that Admiral Benson had not stated the case too strongly. Long
responded, “In that case you had better talk to your President, and I will talk to
my Prime Minister.”24
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From this point, political leaders intervened to resolve the impasse at Paris.
When Daniels reported the naval discussions to Wilson, the president consid-
ered the reality that British support for the League of Nations depended on re-
solving the naval dispute. Wilson instructed Daniels, “Do not leave this matter
in the hands of naval officers. Take it up with Lloyd George. You are both civil-
ians and will understand the situation better than men who belong to the profes-
sion of arms.”25 If Wilson now considered Benson poorly suited to a role in the
negotiations, he could have turned to other naval advisers who were on good
terms with the British. For instance, William S. Sims, the administration’s liaison
with the Admiralty during the war, had established an excellent working rela-
tionship with the British and would have been a fine diplomat and able negotia-
tor. Wilson, however, mistrusted Sims, probably because Sims had been the
naval aide to his Republican rival in the 1912 election, Theodore Roosevelt.
On 1 April Daniels had a breakfast meeting with Lloyd George and Long. The
prime minister suggested, “You ought to stop work on your cruisers and dread-
noughts if you really believe in the League of Nations.” Daniels responded that
limits to the U.S. program could not be invoked before the League was a reality.
When the prime minister insisted the defense of the empire required naval su-
premacy, Daniels countered that the imperatives of the Monroe Doctrine de-
manded even greater U.S. naval forces, since American interests included not
just the Western Hemisphere but Pacific possessions as well. Lloyd George ex-
ploded: “Do you mean to say that your country dominates Mexico, Central
America, and all South America?” Lloyd George and Daniels were now at an im-
passe as intractable as the admirals’ had been. With British support for the
League dependent on U.S. acceptance of a subordinate position in naval
strength, the negotiations were deadlocked. On 6 April, Wilson, in a dramatic
step, prepared to leave the conference for the United States.26 One gets the im-
pression he was using the old salesman’s trick of threatening to leave the negoti-
ations simply to apply pressure.
If so, the ploy seems to have worked, for over the next few days Colonel House
and Lord Robert Cecil, who was responsible for British negotiations on a League
of Nations, worked to broker a compromise to save the conference and the
League. Cecil had been an early advocate of the League and understood that
Anglo-American cooperation would be critical to its success.27 Happily, both
men also understood that their respective nations would have to make conces-
sions in their mutual interests. In his diary for 3 April, House recounted a visit
from Benson that morning urging him to uphold the naval building program:
“Benson is a little obsessed with this idea.” House explained to the admiral that
“if the League was to have a chance of life, it would not do to start its existence by
increasing armaments instead of diminishing them.”28 House believed it was
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sufficient to complete the 1916 program, but Benson and Daniels continued to
press for naval parity with Britain. Wilson should have intervened to settle the
dispute among his representatives. His failure to do so is likely explained by the
fact he was by then consumed with his clash with Prime Minister Georges
Clemenceau over French demands to detach the Rhineland from Germany.29
Daniels would later disparage House for failing to gain both freedom of the
seas and naval parity at the peace conference: “We never lowered our flag of
equality.”30 At the same time, the Naval Advisory Staff in Paris produced another
memorandum for Benson reinforcing the Navy Department’s position. The
staff argued that the crucial test for the League would be its ability to restrain its
strongest member, Great Britain. The success of the League, then, would depend
on naval equality between the United States and Britain. The paper warned
darkly: “Every great commercial rival of the British Empire has eventually found
itself at war with Great Britain and has been defeated.”31
Meanwhile, Cecil was urging the prime minister to moderate his position.
The crisis of the moment was Lloyd George’s refusal to support a Monroe Doc-
trine amendment to the League covenant without an Anglo-American naval
agreement. Cecil pressed Lloyd George to accept the amendment and thereby
keep the question of the League separate from the thorny naval question. In
Cecil’s words, however, “the little man was obdurate.” Finding him immovable,
Cecil appealed directly to House. He reminded House that “to inaugurate the
League of Nations by a competition in armaments between its two chief sup-
porters would doom it to complete sterility or worse.” He admitted that the posi-
tion was being complicated by Britain’s deep-seated popular sentiment about
sea power but pointed out that Britain was more vulnerable to a naval blockade
than any other power, while the United States could “laugh at any blockade.”
Cecil confided to House that were he the naval minister and saw Britain’s sea se-
curity threatened, even by the United States, he would “have to recommend to
my fellow countrymen to spend their last shilling in bringing our fleet up to the
point which I was advised was necessary for safety.” Cecil then suggested a com-
promise solution: Could the United States abandon or modify its new naval
building program as soon as the treaty with the League covenant was signed?
Cecil was confident his government would give corresponding assurances. The
two nations might consult one another from year to year about their naval pro-
grams.32 Here was a formula that “saved face” for both naval powers.
After gaining the president’s approval, House responded on the next day. The
United States could not alter the 1916 naval program but would readily abandon
the 1918 program, which was not yet authorized. House conveyed Wilson’s as-
surance that he understood Britain’s “peculiar position as an Island Empire.”
This was not enough for Lloyd George, who still hoped for a formal naval
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agreement that limited U.S. building, but further assurances on 10 April finally
won over the prime minister. Wilson pledged the United States had no intention
of entering a naval competition with Britain. Furthermore, ships from the 1916
program that had not yet been laid down would be postponed, pending an
Anglo-American naval agreement.
The “naval battle of Paris” had at last ended.33
Josephus Daniels pronounced it a draw, as have most historians since. While
Lloyd George failed to gain formal American recognition of British sea suprem-
acy, he did avoid the enshrining of the American principle of freedom of the seas
in the peace treaty. Belligerent rights in wartime remained intact. Moreover, the
door was left open for further negotiations that would eventually lead to the
Washington Conference of 1921. The Wilson administration secured British
support for Wilson’s peace program without acknowledging British sea suprem-
acy, and Congress could in the future still authorize “a navy second to none.”34
But had the threat of a naval arms race been necessary to achieve Wilson’s pro-
gram? Seth Tillman sees no evidence that the threat of U.S. naval competition
modified the fundamental British position.35 In any case, Wilson’s threat to Brit-
ain’s naval supremacy, however artificial it may have been, proved counterpro-
ductive. Britain had manifested greater enthusiasm than any other European
power for Wilson’s ideals. The only significant disagreement was over freedom
of the seas, which Wilson abandoned early in the game. Wilson could have taken
British support for most of his program for granted had it not been for the naval
competition he sponsored.
The “naval battle of Paris” demonstrates three lessons very well. One is that a
cooperative approach in the negotiations, enlarging mutual interests and devel-
oping collaboration, would have been more productive in the end. Negotiation
theorists have developed a number of principles that this historical case seems to
support. Woodrow Wilson’s and David Lloyd George’s “hardball” negotiating
styles, on the one hand, and House’s and Cecil’s search for mutually beneficial
solutions, on the other, represent the two major paradigms of negotiation the-
ory—bargaining and problem solving. While bargaining characterizes most ne-
gotiations, it implies a zero-sum dynamic. For example, diplomacy between
Cold War rivals naturally took this form. Nevertheless, in an era of globalization
where mutual dependence characterizes the system, problem solving may be the
better approach. P. Terrence Hopmann insists that most research reveals that
problem solving produces “more frequent, efficient, equitable, and durable
agreements than bargaining does.”36 Most negotiations, however, are neither
purely competitive nor collaborative but what negotiation theorists call
“mixed motive” scenarios, involving both mutual dependence and conflict.
In his classic theoretical work on negotiation, Thomas Schelling notes that
J O N E S 8 5
9
Jones: The Naval Battle of Paris
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
mutual dependence demands collaboration and mutual accommodation, al-
though one party can exploit dependence for unilateral gain as Wilson at-
tempted in 1919. Schelling also recognizes that threats (hard bargaining) can be
used to coerce an ally as well as deter an enemy. The difference is one of degree:
the degree of the threat must match the objective and be credible.37 By this mea-
sure, Wilson’s naval challenge to Britain was out of all proportion to his objec-
tives at Paris. Furthermore, once it became apparent the Senate would not
approve Wilson’s 1918 naval construction program, the threat would be no lon-
ger credible. Although the 1916 program remained to cause the British anxiety,
the immediate threat to British naval supremacy had passed.
Another element the “naval battle of Paris” illustrates is axiomatic: the char-
acter and personality of the negotiator matters a great deal, especially in an era of
presidential diplomacy. Woodrow Wilson, more than any prior president and all
but a few presidents since, personally directed diplomacy. Wilson became es-
tranged from his only trusted emissary, House, as soon as he showed initiative
beyond Wilson’s skittish tolerance. His secretary of state, Robert Lansing, had
had the temerity to disagree with his chief and was no longer a member of Wil-
son’s councils. Historians have noted Wilson’s arrogance and his inclination to
surround himself with sycophants.38 Margaret MacMillan, who has written the
definitive account of the Paris Peace Conference, quotes the French ambassador
to the United States as reporting that Wilson “does not have the slightest concep-
tion that he can ever be wrong.”39 Of course, other leaders have had these faults
yet managed to govern well. But Wilson’s arrogance made him unyielding, and
that unsuited him for the give-and-take of diplomacy. Seth Tillman concludes
that although the United States and Britain shared many common interests and
objectives at the peace conference, the “alienation of temperaments” between
Wilson and Lloyd George precluded close cooperation. He implies that Wilson
was the more at fault, because of his limited capacity for concession and accom-
modation.40 Perhaps Lloyd George summed up Wilson’s qualities best, when he
remembered Wilson as having embodied an “extraordinary mixture of real
greatness thwarted by much littleness.”41
Finally, the “naval battle of Paris” is instructive in that it took place in the con-
text of failed attempts to establish a system of collective security and to restore
global trade and prosperity. Two authors writing in this journal on the U.S. sea
services’ 2007 maritime strategy, Geoffrey Till and Robert Rubel, cite historian
Niall Ferguson’s thesis that the world was globalizing until the catastrophic
Great War destroyed the international order.42 The parallels with our own time
are obvious—an international system is developing that makes multiple great
powers mutually dependent on global trade. As in the era of the First World War,
globalization today is fragile. Great-power rivalry and the growing power of
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nonstate actors pose critical risks to the postmodern era of globalization. The
risks to the system demand cooperative multilateralism. In a recent article in
Foreign Affairs, Richard Haass predicts, “There will be a premium on con-
sultation and coalition building and on a diplomacy that encourages
cooperation when possible and shields such cooperation from the fallout of in-
evitable disagreements.”43
National security strategy documents already signal a shift toward greater
multilateralism. In language that harks back to Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric, The
National Strategy for Maritime Security promises to strengthen international
partnerships, advance global trade, and abide by the “principles of freedom of
the seas.”44 Likewise, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower stresses
the need to promote collective security and the rule of law.45 While these docu-
ments recognize the need to maintain naval strength and war-fighting capabil-
ity, they also assert that “preventing wars is as important as winning wars.”46 This
implies a marriage of sea power and effective diplomacy. Furthermore, these
strategies recognize that no single nation, not even the United States, has the re-
sources to protect all the world’s seas. With the global economy slowing and re-
vealing its weaknesses, the truth of this maxim is all the more apparent.
Interestingly, this same truth dawned on Great Britain in 1918–19, when the
British recognized that their economy could no longer sustain the ruinous ex-
penditures required by global naval superiority.
Woodrow Wilson’s vision is perhaps more relevant than ever. Whether or not
a single international organization is the right vehicle, as Wilson assumed it was,
greater multilateral cooperation is imperative. Wilson’s peace program failed to
prevent a second Great War not because his vision of collective security
was unreliable but because his diplomacy was flawed. National chauvinism
was incompatible with Wilson’s internationalist peace program. The Wilson
administration created what Michael Simpson has called “an artificial naval ri-
valry” that continued for another decade and prevented close cooperation be-
tween the two great sea powers at a critical moment in history.47 We are likely
living in a similar epoch, and cooperation between sea powers could mean the
difference between peace and stability or the collapse of globalization.
N O T E S
1. Of course, there were other neutral powers
whose trade suffered, such as Norway and the
Netherlands, but the United States was by far
the largest neutral shipper.
2. Michael Simpson, Anglo-American Naval Re-
lations (London: Naval Records Society,
1991), p. 486.
J O N E S 8 7
11
Jones: The Naval Battle of Paris
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
3. Mary Klachko, “Anglo-American Naval
Competition, 1918–1922” (PhD dissertation,
Columbia University, 1962), p. 54.
4. Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of
American Naval Power, 1776–1918, 1966 ed.
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990),
pp. 390–91.
5. Simpson, Anglo-American Naval Relations,
pp. 479–82.
6. Eric Geddes, memorandum to War Council,
2 August 1918, ADM 116/1809, in Simpson,
Anglo-American Naval Relations, p. 504.
7. Director of Plans, memorandum, September
1918, ADM 137/2710; and Notes for Confer-
ence with Navy Department, October 1918,
ADM 116/1809; both in Simpson, Anglo-
American Naval Relations, p. 525.
8. Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points, which as-
pired to establish the end of the war (still ten
months away) on a moral basis, were an-
nounced in a speech to Congress on 8 Janu-
ary 1918. For the text see World War I
Document Archive, on the Brigham Young
University Library website, at wwi.lib
.byu.edu/.
9. Rear Adm. Sir S. Fremantle, memorandum,
and comments by U.S. Naval Planning Sec-
tion, October 1918, NSF/TX, in Simpson,
Anglo-American Naval Relations, pp. 545–46.
10. Rosslyn Wemyss, memorandum, 17 October
1918, ADM 116/1810, in Simpson, Anglo-
American Naval Relations, pp. 548–51. See
also David Trask, Captains and Cabinets:
Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1918
(Columbia: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1972), p.
320.
11. Klachko, “Naval Competition,” p. 77.
12. Seth Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the
Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961), p. 289.
13. Simpson, Anglo-American Naval Relations, p.
488.
14. Woodrow Wilson, State of the Union Mes-
sage, 2 December 1918, in The Papers of
Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur Link (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966–94) [here-
after Wilson Papers], vol. 53, p. 282.
15. Edith Benham, diary, 10 January 1919, in
Wilson Papers, vol. 53, p. 707.
16. Josephus Daniels, press statement, 4 January
1919, in Simpson, Anglo-American Naval Re-
lations, pp. 585–86.
17. Gilbert Fairchild Close [Wilson’s secretary]
to William Benson, 27 January 1919, in Wil-
son Papers, vol. 54, p. 303.
18. The Naval Advisory Staff supported Benson
in his role as Wilson’s chief technical adviser
on naval affairs at Paris. The staff’s memoran-
dums were directed to Benson and sometimes
forwarded to Daniels and Wilson.
19. U.S. Naval Advisory Staff, “Disposition of
German and Austrian Vessels of War,” mem-
orandum, 13 March 1919, in Wilson Papers,
vol. 55, pp. 515–21.
20. Mary Klachko, Admiral William Shepherd
Benson: First Chief of Naval Operations, with
David Trask (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1987), p. 144.
21. Adm. Sir William Lowther Grant, “British
Policy as Regards the American Naval
Programme,” memorandum for War Cabi-
net, 25 February 1919, ADM 116/1773, in
Simpson, Anglo-American Naval Relations,
pp. 590–94.
22. William Benson, memorandum on Anglo-
American talks on naval building at the Paris
Peace Conference, March 1919, 16 May 1921,
Benson Papers, in Simpson, Anglo-American
Naval Relations, pp. 597–99.
23. Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of
War and After, 1917–1923 (Chapel Hill: Univ.
of North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 396.
24. Benson memorandum, 16 May 1921.
25. Daniels, Wilson Era, p. 375.
26. Ibid., pp. 377–79; Josephus Daniels, diary, 1
April 1919, in Wilson Papers, vol. 56, pp.
518–19; and Tillman, Anglo-American Rela-
tions, p. 91.
27. “Robert Cecil: The Nobel Peace Prize
1937—Biography,” Nobelprize.org.
28. Edward House, diary, 3 April 1919, in Wilson
Papers, vol. 56, pp. 558–59.
29. The disagreement over the fate of the
Rhineland also imperiled the conference and
was, along with the naval question, one of the
great stumbling blocks of the conference. See
Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months
8 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/7
That Changed the World (New York: Random
House, 2001), pp. 198–203.
30. Daniels, Wilson Era, pp. 381–88.
31. U.S. Naval Advisory Staff, memorandum, 7
April 1919, NSF/TX, in Simpson, Anglo-
American Naval Relations, pp. 601–605.
32. Robert Cecil, diary, 8–10 April 1919; and
Robert Cecil to Edward House, 8 April 1919;
both in Wilson Papers, vol. 57, pp. 142–43.
33. Edward House to Robert Cecil, 9 April 1919;
and Robert Cecil, memorandum to Edward
House, 10 April 1919; both in The Intimate
Papers of Colonel House: The Ending of the
War, ed. Charles Seymour (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 1928), pp. 420–23. As it
turned out, Wilson would soon be out of of-
fice, and it would be a Republican adminis-
tration that negotiated an agreement at the
Washington Conference of 1921.
34. Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between the
Wars: The Period of Anglo-American Antago-
nism (New York: Walker, 1976), p. 100.
35. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, p. 294.
36. P. Terrence Hopmann, “Two Paradigms of
Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solv-
ing,” Annals of the American Academy of Po-
litical and Social Science 542 (November
1995), pp. 24–27.
37. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict,
2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1980), pp. 11, 83–89.
38. See John Morton Blum, Woodrow Wilson and
the Politics of Morality (Boston: Little, Brown,
1956); and Tillman, Anglo-American Rela-
tions, pp. 405–406.
39. MacMillan, Paris 1919, pp. 5, 149.
40. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, pp.
405–406.
41. David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace
Conference (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ.
Press, 1939), vol. 1, pp. 154–55.
42. Geoffrey Till, “New Directions in Maritime
Strategy? Implications for the U.S. Navy,”
Naval War College Review 60, no. 4 (Autumn
2007), pp. 39–40; and Robert Rubel, “The
New Maritime Strategy: The Rest of the
Story,” Naval War College Review 61, no. 2
(Spring 2008), pp. 74–75.
43. Richard Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity,”
Foreign Affairs 87 (May/June 2008), pp.
51–56.
44. The National Strategy for Maritime Security
(Washington, D.C.: White House, 20
September 2005), available at www
.whitehouse.gov/.
45. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower (Washington, D.C.: October 2007),
available at www.navy.mil/maritime/
MaritimeStrategy.pdf, reprinted in Naval
War College Review 61, no. 1 (Winter 2008),
pp. 7–19.
46. Ibid.
47. Simpson, Anglo-American Naval Relations, p.
493.
J O N E S 8 9
13
Jones: The Naval Battle of Paris
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
